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ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3	HR		
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

~~Top Secret~~

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. [redacted] 3.5(c)

[redacted] 3.5(c)

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Friday August 27, 1976 CI NIDC 76-202C

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~Top Secret~~

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

CUBA-ARGENTINA: Two Cubans Missing

3.5(c) //The recent disappearance of two Cuban embassy staff members in Buenos Aires is seriously straining relations between Argentina and Cuba. If it is established that the two were killed by Argentine security officials, Havana could break relations.//

3.5(c)

3.3(b)(1)

the two Cubans were killed because an investigation into their activities had revealed that they were providing direct assistance to an Argentine guerrilla organization. the men were agents of the Cuban intelligence organization.// 3.3(b)(1)

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

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3.5(c) //Some Cuban officials in Buenos Aires are reportedly convinced of the Argentine government's involvement, although others suspect that the disappearance was a Cuban exile operation.//

3.5(c) //To underscore Cuba's concern, which has already been expressed to Argentine officials in both Havana and Buenos Aires, Havana last week recalled three merchant ships chartered by Cuba and already en route to Buenos Aires to pick up 1,800 Argentine-manufactured cars and trucks.//

3.5(c) //Prime Minister Fidel Castro is known to be personally concerned about the continuing terrorist incidents involving Cuban fishermen at sea and diplomatic and commercial representatives abroad. 3.3(b)(1) In an aggressive speech on June 6, Castro warned that Cuba may respond in kind to future acts of terrorism.//

3.5(c) //If there is good evidence of the Argentine government's role in the Buenos Aires killings, Castro may choose to break relations despite the effect this would have on trade between the two countries. In 1975, Cuba imported some $160-million worth of Argentine goods--about 4 percent of Cuba's overall imports.//

3.5(c) //He may believe, in any case, that maintaining relations with Argentina's military government has become untenable in light of his own criticism of countries that maintain ties with the "fascist" government in Chile. 3.5(c)

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